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Abstract. In this paper, the possibility of developing a Heideggerian solution to the 
Schizophrenia Problem associated with cognitive technologies is investigated. This 
problem arises as a result of the computer bracketing emotion from cognition during 
human-computer interaction and results in human psychic self-amputation. It is argued 
that in order to solve the Schizophrenia Problem, it is necessary to first solve the ‘hard 
problem’ of consciousness since emotion is at least partially experiential. Heidegger’s 
thought, particularly as interpreted by Hubert Dreyfus, appears relevant in this regard 
since it ostensibly provides the basis for solving the ‘hard problem’ via the construction 
of artificial systems capable of the emergent generation of conscious experience. 
However, it will be shown that Heidegger’s commitment to a non-experiential 
conception of nature renders this whole approach problematic, thereby necessitating 
consideration of alternative, post-Heideggerian approaches to solving the Schizophrenia 
Problem. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Janney, “an underlying assumption of Cognitive Technology [is] that 
computers can be regarded as tools for prosthetically extending the capacities of the 
human mind.” (Janney, 1997, p.1) On this view, Cognitive Technology is not concerned 
with the replication or replacement of human cognition - arguably the central goal of 
‘strong’ artificial intelligence - but with the construction of cyborgs, that is, cybernetic 
organisms or man-machine hybrids, in which possibilities for human cognition are 
enhanced (Haraway, 1985). However, it may be necessary to reconsider this position in 
order to address what might be referred to as the ‘Schizophrenia Problem’ associated 
with human-computer interaction. Janney describes the essence of this problem as 
follows: “As a partner, the computer tends to resemble a schizophrenic suffering from 
severe ‘intrapsychic ataxia’ – the psychiatric term for a radical separation of cognition 
from emotion. Its frame of reference, like that of the schizophrenic, is detached, rigid, 
and self-reflexive. Interacting in accordance with the requirements of its programs, the 
computer, like the schizophrenic, forces us to empathize one-sidedly with it and 
communicate with it on its own terms. And the suspicion arises that the better we can do 
this, the more like it we become.” (Janney, 1997, p.1) Crucially, on his view, 
intrapsychic ataxia, is “a built-in feature of computers.” (Janney, 1997, p.4) 
Notwithstanding the intrinsic nature of the Schizophrenia Problem, Janney remains 
optimistic about the possibility of its (at least partial) ‘solution’ within cognitive 
technologies as is evidenced by his intent ‘to encourage discussion about what can be 
done in Cognitive Technology to address the problems pointed out [emphasis added].” 
(Janney, 1997, p.1) As he goes on to state, “an important future goal of Cognitive 
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Technology will have to be to encourage the development of computer technology that 
reduces our need for psychic self-amputation.” (Janney, 1997, p.5) 
While concurring with Janney that “a one-sided extension of the cognitive capacities 
of the human mind – at the expense of the user’s emotional and motivational capacities 
– is technological madness” (Janney, 1997, p.1), it is maintained that if the 
Schizophrenia Problem is to be ‘solved’ - by which is meant elimination and not mere 
reduction of the need for psychic self-amputation – it will be necessary for Cognitive 
Technology to reconsider its position on the issue of replication of human cognition and 
emotion. Although efforts are underway in this direction, it is suggested herein that they 
are unlikely to prove ultimately successful. This is because the Schizophrenia problem 
can be shown to be intrinsically, if only partially, related to the ‘hard problem’ of 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1996), that is, the problem of explaining how ontological 
subjectivity (or first-person experience) can arise from an ontologically objective (or 
non-experiential) substrate. For example, Picard (1997) has argued that the problem of 
synthesizing emotion can largely be bracketed from the problem of explaining (and 
possibly synthesizing) consciousness. However, as she is careful to point out, 
consciousness and emotion, while not identical, are “closely intertwined”. While current 
scientific (specifically, neurological) evidence lends support to the view that 
consciousness is not necessary for the occurrence of all emotions, Picard concedes that 
emotional experience “appears to rely upon consciousness for its existence.” (Picard, 
1997, p.73) If consciousness is necessary for emotional experience, then in order to 
solve the Schizophrenia Problem, cognitive technologies must first solve the ‘hard 
problem’. This would seem to suggest that, contrary to one of the underlying 
assumptions of Cognitive Technology, replication of mind (cognition and emotion) – 
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arguably the central goal of AI (or Artificial Intelligence) – constitutes a necessary 
condition for IA (or Intelligence Augmentation). 
In this connection, it might be argued that the thought of the German 
phenomenologist Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) - more specifically, that aspect of his 
early thinking concerned with the being (or ontology) of human beings as interpreted by 
Hubert Dreyfus - is highly relevant to Cognitive Technology in that it appears to suggest 
how the Schizophrenia Problem can be solved. According to Dreyfus (1991), Heidegger 
holds subjective experience to be grounded in, and thereby emergent from, a more 
primitive existential experience - Dasein or being-in-the-world - that is ontologically 
prior to subjectivity and objectivity. If Dreyfus’ Heidegger is correct, then the 
Schizophrenia Problem is solvable because the ‘hard problem’ can be solved by 
constructing artificial Daseins capable of generating consciousness as an emergent 
phenomenon. 
In this paper, it will be argued that appealing to Heideggerian thought in the context 
of attempting to solve the Schizophrenia Problem associated with cognitive 
technologies is problematic on (at least) three counts: First, Dreyfus’ interpretation of 
Heidegger, or rather, technologists’ selective appropriation of Dreyfus’ interpretation of 
Heidegger, while (possibly) illuminating from a technological standpoint, can be shown 
to be distorting when viewed from the perspective of Heidegger scholarship. Crucially, 
this fact may be of more than merely academic significance; second, Heidegger’s 
commitment to an empirical-realist conception of nature as intrinsically non-
experiential can be shown to undermine the possibility of a Heideggerian ‘emergentist’ 
solution to the ‘hard problem’; third, it is suggested that because the technical 
construction of artificial systems - in this instance, synthetic Daseins - occurs under an 
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implicit subject-object (or artificer-artifact) orientation, the primitive components of 
such systems will necessarily stand in extrinsic (or external) relation to each other. This 
fact is of critical significance since Heidegger holds that beings are relationally-
constituted, thereby entailing a commitment to an ontology grounded in intrinsic (or 
internal) relationality. 
In closing, it will be argued  that since Heidegger cannot solve the ‘hard problem’, it 
is necessary to look elsewhere for a solution to the Schizophrenia Problem. In this 
connection, Whiteheadian panexperientialism seems promising in that it appears to 
solve the ‘hard problem’. However, this is at the price of a commitment to an ontology 
grounded in intrinsic (or internal) relationality which undermines the possibility for 
constructing artificial Daseins capable of consciousness, thereby rendering the 
Schizophrenia Problem unsolvable. 
2 ‘THE DREYFUS AFFAIR’ 
 
Determining the implications of Heidegger’s thought for Cognitive Technology is 
arguably as difficult a task as determining his standing in Western academic philosophy: 
On the one hand, Heidegger is (generally) regarded as an intellectual charlatan of 
consummate proportion (and extremely dubious moral standing) by members of the 
Anglo-American philosophical establishment; on the other, he is (largely) revered as a 
genuinely original thinker who has contributed both profusely and profoundly to the 
enrichment of Continental philosophy. Similarly, on the one hand, Heidegger's later 
thought, in particular, his assertion that “the essence of technology is by no means 
anything technological” (Heidegger, 1977, p.4), has been regarded by anti-technologists 
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as establishing grounds upon which to mount a universal critique of technology; on the 
other hand, certain Heideggerian insights have been embraced by technologists in an 
attempt at resolving intractable problems of long standing. Although the claim that 
Heidegger has contributed significantly to the debate on the meaning and scope of 
technology is not, in itself, in question, determining the precise nature of his 
contribution(s) – in the present context, the implications of his thought for the 
development and critical evaluation of cognitive technologies - is problematic because 
there are many ways to interpret and appropriate his meditations on this issue by 
appealing to different ‘aspects’ and ‘phases’ of his phenomenological inquiry into 
being. 
In this connection, Dreyfus’ (1972) seminal critique of ‘GOFAI’ (Good-Old-
Fashioned-Artificial-Intelligence), which makes extensive use of the ‘existential 
analytic of Dasein’ (that is, the situated analysis of the onto-phenomenological 
structures of human being) presented in Heidegger's Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962) 
in order to contest the sufficiency of disembodied, a-contextual, symbolic computation 
as a means by which to instantiate real yet synthetic intelligence, has played an 
important, perhaps even decisive, role in motivating practitioners to consider engaged, 
embedded, and non-representational approaches to computing grounded (at least partly) 
in Heideggerian thought. It is crucial to appreciate at the outset that Dreyfus’ approach 
to AI critique was philosophical and not technological, being driven by a desire to draw 
attention to the perceived failings of an extant technology. Dreyfus’ primary concern 
was not - and, arguably, could not be, given his lack of technical expertise - to develop 
technological solutions to the problems of AI; this task was left to the technologists 
among his later followers. Connectionist approaches to consciousness (Globus, 1995) 
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and cognition (Clark, 1997), robotic approaches to artificial life (Wheeler, 1996) (Prem, 
1997), and the (re)conceptualisation of the information systems paradigm in terms of 
communication rather than computation (Winograd and Flores, 1986) (Coyne, 1995) 
have all benefited from Dreyfus’ engagement with Heidegger. 
There are (at least) two points to note in connection with the above: First, ‘The 
Dreyfus Affair’ - that is, Dreyfus’ engagement with Heidegger on the one hand, and 
with the AI community on the other - provides a relatively recent example of the social 
determination of technology, the specifically philosophical character of the 
determination calling into question more conventional theses on technological 
determinism; second, perhaps what is most significant and yet often overlooked, is the 
fact that Dreyfus’ critique of AI was only finally acknowledged and subsequently 
integrated into technology theory and practice because it could be so incorporated. In 
short, it is maintained that Dreyfus - and thereby Heidegger - was eventually taken 
seriously by technologists because his interpretation of Heidegger allowed the 
technological project to continue. 
While this appears to reverse the order of determination described previously, it is not 
this fact that is especially interesting since the reflexive nature of the relations of 
determination between society and technology has long been appreciated by sociologists 
and philosophers of technology. Rather, what is interesting, is the fact that Dreyfus’ 
critique was ultimately regarded as both valid and relevant because it showed that an 
embedded developmental history of embodied engagement constitutes a necessary 
condition for ‘coping’ with the world in an intelligent manner. Crucially, as Olafson 
(1994) and others have shown, Dreyfus’ notion of ‘coping’ is grounded in an 
instrumentalist-pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger's thought. However, as Blattner 
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(1992), Fell (1992), and, significantly, Dreyfus himself (Dreyfus, 1992), have all shown, 
instrumentalist, pragmatist and/or behaviourist interpretations of Heidegger's thought 
are both limited and ‘dangerous’ because partial and hence, distorting. According to 
Olafson, “it would be a pity if Dreyfus, who has done so much to refute the computer 
theory of human being, were to be in the painful position of seeing his own formulations 
give an illusory sense of affinity with Heidegger to people who are utterly at odds with 
his views.” (Olafson, 1994, p.52) It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that Dreyfus, who has 
been charged with misappropriating Heidegger's thought on various grounds1, himself 
ends up being misappropriated by practitioners of technoscience (AI, A-Life etc). 
In summary, and philosophically speaking, ‘The Dreyfus Affair’ appears to be over. 
3 HEIDEGGER AND COGNITIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 
The implications of the end of ‘The Dreyfus Affair’ for Cognitive Technology are 
somewhat unclear since it is possible that Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger remains 
practically relevant despite its philosophical shortcomings. For example, the application 
of Heideggerian thought to cognitive technology with the latter interpreted as artificial 
(or synthetic) means by which meaning might be extended in the interaction between 
humans and machines appears warranted given (1) the identification of being with 
intelligibility or meaning, viz. Sein as Sinn (or sense), (2) the mutual dependency of 
being and Dasein (or being-in-the-world), (3) the ontological priority of Dasein over the 
conscious subject, and (4) the onto-phenomenological claim that being-with (Mitsein) 
other Daseins is a constitutive existential structure of Dasein. This is because (1)-(4) 
ostensibly provide the foundations of a framework for solving the Schizophrenia 
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Problem by allowing for an emergentist solution to the ‘hard problem’ that can be 
implemented by natural and artificial (or synthetic) Daseins alike. On this basis, it might 
be argued that it is necessary to shift the goal of cognitive technology from constructing 
‘instruments of mind’ - what Heidegger would call Zuhandenheit, which Dreyfus 
translates as ‘availability’ (or that which is ‘ready-to-hand’) in reference to Dasein-
centric, pragmatically-functional, transparent ‘equipment’ (Zeug) - to emergent 
construction of minded-instruments, that is, ‘instruments with mind’. 
4 HEIDEGGER AND THE ‘HARD PROBLEM’ OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
According to Schatzki (1982), Heidegger is an empirical realist: On his view, what 
something is ‘in itself’ is what it is independently of its actually being encountered by a 
Dasein. (Kant, by contrast, is held to be a transcendental realist: On his view, what 
something is ‘in itself’ is what it is independently of any possible knowledge of it.) It is 
crucial to appreciate that empirical realism entails that the being of all beings, both 
human and non-human, is, in principle, publicly accessible to Dasein because this fact 
assumes critical significance when the ‘other-minds’ problem, that is, the problem of 
determining whether or not other beings are capable of consciousness (first-personhood, 
ontological subjectivity, private experience), is considered. The (later) Heideggerian 
solution to this problem involves recognizing the following as existential facts: (1) 
being-with other Daseins is a fundamental (or constitutive) structure of Dasein; (2) 
Dasein (as being-in-the-world) has primacy over consciousness; (3) both Dasein and 
consciousness are linguistically-constructed. On this basis, the ‘other-minds’ problem is 
discharged by observing that because (1) Daseins share language and (2) there are a 
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plurality of Daseins, therefore, a plurality of consciousnesses (or minds) is possible. 
However, it is important to draw out the full implications of this approach to solving the 
‘other-minds’ problem: Heidegger is forced to conceive subjectivity in objective (or 
public) terms because, on his empirically-realist view, the subjectivity of a subject is 
disclosable, in principle, to and by other subjects. Since it is only Daseins that share 
language, only Daseins can become consciousnesses (or first-person, private subjects). 
Crucially, on his view, nature as it is ‘in-itself’ (that is, independent of Dasein) discloses 
itself ‘in a barren merciless’ as ontologically objective and hence, ‘absurd’ or 
meaningless. Heidegger (1962) insists that this view of nature is not grounded in a value 
judgement but reflects an ontological determination that follows from the fact that it is 
Dasein alone who gives being (intelligibility or meaning) to beings2. However, this 
position is contestable on (at least) four grounds: 
First, it is not at all clear that consciousness is a (purely) linguistic phenomenon, more 
specifically, an emergent linguistic artifact. 
Second, more importantly, it does not follow from the fact that since Daseins are the 
only beings that share language, therefore only Daseins are capable of conscious (or at 
least some degree of private, subjective) experience. According to Krell (1992), life 
may constitute a sufficient existential condition for being a ‘clearing’ or ‘opening’, that 
is, a space of possible ways for things (including human beings) to be. While it might be 
conceded that the being (sense or meaning) of beings disclosed by Dasein is of a 
significantly higher order than that disclosed by (other) beings themselves, it simply 
does not follow from the shareability of language peculiar to Dasein that disclosure of 
being by other beings is impossible; human-centred meaning is not necessarily 
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coextensive with meaning as such. In short, Heidegger's position appears untenably 
anthropocentric. 
Third, the view that nature is fundamentally ‘vacuous’ or non-experiential is an 
assumption which is undermined by the empirical fact that while experiential beings are 
definitively known to exist, it is unclear whether any non-experiential beings have, in 
fact, ever been encountered (Griffin, 1998). 
Finally, Heidegger’s dualism of meaningful subjects and meaningless objects gives 
rise to the ‘hard problem’ (Chalmers, 1996), that is, the problem of explaining how 
ontological subjectivity can arise from an ontologically objective substrate. Heidegger 
cannot avoid this problem because his empirical realism commits him to the view that 
science can, in principle, causally explain how things came to be the way they are 
(Dreyfus, 1991); clearly, this includes explaining how the brain - which Globus (1995) 
identifies as a necessary condition for Dasein - can give rise to consciousness. 
Emergentist solutions to the ‘hard problem’, which view consciousness as an irreducible 
systemic property arising from the interaction of components, none of which possess 
this property or properties categorially-continuous with this property in isolation or in 
other systemic complexes, are problematic because they disregard the principle of 
ontological continuity, arguably a cornerstone of scientific naturalism (Griffin, 1998)3. 
5 POST-HEIDEGGERIAN ONTOLOGY AND COGNITIVE TECHNOLOGY  
 
It appears then that Heidegger’s engagement with cognitive technology, at least with 
respect to the relevance of his thought to the Schizophrenia Problem, is, like ‘The 
Dreyfus Affair’, at an end. Principally, this is because Heidegger cannot solve the ‘hard 
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problem’ due to what is, somewhat ironically, a phenomenologically-unsound 
(mis)conception of nature as intrinsically non-experiential. Thus, if the Schizophrenia 
Problem is to be addressed, it is necessary to consider ‘post-Heideggerian’ conceptions 
of the being of nature. 
On Whiteheadian panexperientialism, for example, nature is held to be relationally-
constituted and experiential at its most primitive ontological level. However, this does 
not imply that all beings are experiential in the same way (that is, ontological monism 
does not entail ontical monism); rather, certain complex beings enjoy a higher-level of 
experience relative to simpler beings. In addition, all complex beings belong to one of 
two kinds, experiential ‘compound’ (or ‘societal’) individuals or non-experiential 
aggregates, depending on the nature of their internal (or constitutive) relational 
organisation (Griffin, 1998). 
Crucially, if Whiteheadian panexperientialism is the way that nature is in-itself then 
the possibility of constructing an artificial Dasein is radically undermined because 
artificing (construction, making) involves an orientation in which ‘subjects’ stand in 
ontological opposition to ‘objects’ (Heidegger, 1977), thereby ‘rupturing’ the nexus of 
internal (subjective, constitutive) relations constituting natural beings so as to establish - 
more precisely, impose - external (objective, non-constitutive) relations between 
‘primitives’ (components) in the synthetic systemic complex (Ladrière, 1998). To the 
extent that Dasein is, ontically-speaking, a natural phenomenon4, its being must be 
internally-constituted; however, artificial systems are externally-constituted which 
implies that they cannot provide the necessary ontical (causal) substrate for Dasein. In 
short, genuine Mitsein, arguably a necessary condition for an emergentist solution to the 
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‘hard problem’ and, thereby, to the Schizophrenia Problem associated with cognitive 
technologies, cannot be generated technically. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
If, as has been herein argued, the Schizophrenia Problem is unsolvable in the sense 
that the need for human psychic self-amputation cannot be eliminated completely but 
merely reduced in extent, it appears that cognitive technologies are faced with a choice: 
Either uphold the assumption of phenomenological symmetry underlying Janney’s 
conflated conception of “the prosthesis as partner” and consider alternative 
technological prostheses other than the computer, or abandon this assumption and 
embrace a genuinely pragmatic - and Heideggerian - orientation to the computer taken 
as tool5. Irrespective of the choice made, Janney’s project of “finding out where the 
prosthesis ‘pinches’, so to speak [since] progress will depend on discovering and 
describing the sources of sensory and psychic irritation at the human-computer 
interface” (Janney, 1997, p.5), remains both valid and important. 
NOTES 
 
 
1. For example, with respect to the question of whether Heideggerian 
phenomenology is anti-individualistic (Olafson, 1994), anti-representational in character 
(Christensen, 1997, 1998), and at least minimally consistent with some version of 
scientific naturalism (Christensen, 1997, 1998) (Pylkkö, 1998). 
2. According to Fell, “[this] is one of the most problematic assertions in the entire 
Heideggerian corpus." (Fell, 1979, p.119) 
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3. It might be argued that the validity of this argument is called into question by the 
fact that “‘consciousness’ and its cognates are no longer part of Heidegger’s operative 
philosophical vocabulary. They have been replaced by a concept of existence as the 
mode of being of an entity for which the things with which it deals are there [Da-Sein], 
whether in the mode of perceptual presence or some other form of presence-in-
absence.” (Olafson, 1994, p.52) Crucially, “if Dasein is a unitary entity defined by 
existence and presence and not a compound of body and mind, then it is utterly obscure 
how ‘consciousness’ could be reintroduced into it.” For this reason, Olafson maintains 
that “if the story of the demise of ‘consciousness’ and ‘mind’ had been told in a way 
that does full justice to the ontology that replaces mind-body dualism, this sort of ad 
hoc revision [in which Dasein ‘emerges as a conscious subject’] would be quite 
unnecessary.” (Olafson, 1994, p.52) However, if Heideggerian phenomenology is 
indeed a form of empirical realism, and if, as Dreyfus maintains, “later Heidegger could 
be called a plural realist”, that is, one who asserts that “there can be many true answers 
to the question, What is real?” (Dreyfus, 1991, pp.262-263) including a scientifically-
naturalistic answer, and granted Heidegger’s ‘disenchanted’ conception of nature in 
both his early and later thinking, it follows that some such ‘emergentist’ revision as the 
one proposed by Dreyfus is necessary and yet insufficient as a solution to the ‘hard 
problem’. 
4. On empirical-realism, specific natural - more precisely, biological - conditions 
are necessary, yet insufficient, for Dasein (Dreyfus, 1991) (Globus, 1995). 
5. A similar position is adopted by Stojanov and Stojanoski (2001) who argue that 
computers should not be viewed as interlocutors (or dialogic agents) standing in a 
symmetric relation with human beings, but rather as asymmetrically-related cognitive 
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prostheses for humans. However, it is important to appreciate that their position is 
grounded in the assumption that interface ontology is metaphorical, an epistemological 
stance that conflicts with the ontological orientation of Heideggerian phenomenology in 
which how something is taken to be is constitutive of what that thing is. 
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